Abstract-Successful enforcement of information security requires an understanding of a complex interplay of social and technological forces. Drawing on socio-technical literature to develop an analytical framework, we examine the relationship between security policies and power in organizations. We use our framework to study three examples of security policy from a large empirical study n an international company. Each example highlights a different aspect of our framework. Our results, from in-depth interviews with 55 staff members at all levels, show that there is often non-compliance in the detail of organizational information security policies; this is not willful but is in response to shortcomings in the policy and to meet business needs. We conclude by linking our findings to recent research on the institutional economics of information security. We suggest ways in which our framework can be used by organizational decision-makers to review and re-think existing security policies.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we analyze information security as a manifestation of forms of power: the productive form of power as power-to, dominant power as power-over, and power as the intended or unintended working out of technological and social changes [7, 42] .
Researchers at the Tavistock Institute [39] first analyzed the social implications of technical changes, and demonstrated that to understand technology in social structures -that is, all technology that actually exists -it is necessary to take seriously both the technical and the social. This early research showed how new, more "efficient" working arrangements led to new forms of power, in which some workers were disadvantaged and, in response, adopted various forms of defense, "though they may not always be clear as to the exact nature of the resentment" [39:16] .
This way of thinking has so far not been applied to information security in a systematic fashion; in particular, there has been no consideration of what this means for the design of effective security policies. Cognitive and psycho-social concepts such as trust to design robust online environments [24, 36] have been applied, and there is awareness that real threats from "social engineering" and human error arise more often from social than from technical vulnerabilities. Economics [2, 5, 20] has also provided insights into the costs and benefits of security practices to organizations and individuals.
Although these approaches do not ignore power, they assume that power is simply there, and, in a sense, invisible. Yet power underlies the implementation of information security policies. Organizations assert their policies through enforcement in various ways; for each enforcement there is a reaction. Individuals have a choice in the extent to which they comply with security policies, and their choice is based on their goals, perceptions and attitudes [1, 6, 41] .
Our argument, put simply, is that information security cannot simply be imposed by rule, as "Hobbesian" or sovereign power [12] , but emerges from the interplay of social and technical actors. This realization is a challenge to conventional security thinking, which emphasizes written policies and endorsement by senior management (for example, [40] ). These are the necessary underpinnings of information security, but they say nothing about the on-the-ground enactment of policies in everyday practice.
In this paper, we explore the nature of power within an organization, based on insights from earlier socio-technical literature and recent research from the area of economics of information security. Our aim is to integrate these insights into guidance for senior information security officers who are, after all, managers, and required to balance many competing considerations with the overall organizational imperative to support the business needs of the organization [35] .
We relate concepts from this literature to findings from 55 interviews with employees in a large international company, conducted between May and October 2010. Our interviews were semi-structured around a set of security policies, sufficiently flexible to explore emerging issues with the participants. They were fully transcribed and analyzed using Grounded Theory [10, 19] , a well-established methodology to generate unifying theories from qualitative data and to validate findings in a process of continuous comparison.
II. POWER IN ORGANISATIONS
How does an organization assert its policies? One approach is to require employees to read and then follow written documentation or rules. This approach seems unlikely to be successful: in this organization, few participants have read the policies on the company intranet, and many are not even aware of their existence.
While the concern of security policies is ostensibly to prevent "bad things from happening" [26] , the actual operation of these policies in mainly disciplinary, in Foucault's [16] terms. That is to say, it is concerned less to punish malicious acts than it is with non-compliance. One approach is to enforce policy by technological means -firewalls, filters, software and hardware configuration -but this enforcement rarely covers all behaviors.
Alternatively, social measures may be instituted, requiring positive effort on the part of employees, through myriad small rules. This carries a cost: as Beautement et al [6] have shown, compliance is a limited resource. Since in many cases total assurance -in the sense of policies which are enforced by technological or social means -is impossible or undesirable, and carries social as well as organizational costs, the organization has to trust its employees not to circumvent or otherwise negate policies [14] .
In this paper, rather than taking trust and enforcement as a dialectic, we consider both as different facets of power. We argue that designing and enforcing organizational policies is, fundamentally, an exercise of organizational power.
Power has been studied extensively in Information Systems [22, 37] , while, in the social sciences, there is a rich literature on power, from varied perspectives. It is all the more notable, then, that ideas of power have been applied so little to studies of information security. The sparse literature that does exist addresses power broadly across a spectrum from the most high-level development of standards to their practical adoption [3, 18, 25, 27, 38] , but largely fails to examine policies as they are integrated and enacted through social and technical means.
Although these existing contributions provide a theoretical background, they lack the depth of early socio-technical literature because they do not consider how security policies are encountered in peoples' daily experiences. In this paper, we start to fill this gap through detailed investigations of staff members' interactions with security policies. We develop a framework that incorporates three major strands in the study of power to provide an overall view, to identify breakdowns, and to suggest ways in which they might be overcome.
A. Dimensions of Power
A simple intuitive -or, as Lukes [32] says, "onedimensional" -view of power is that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" [12] . This view also implies conflict, or at least a difference in preferences -B would not necessarily prefer to do the thing that A would like him or her to do.
However, this simple view focuses too much on power in situations of "actual and observable conflict" [32:27] . In many cases, power does not act directly like this, but draws on social rules that are not necessarily clearly observable. This "soft power" [33] can act through setting the agenda, or at an even more fundamental level by changing peoples' basic preferences. Rather than a force which acts directly, we could think about power as like a "billiard table that is skewed or made uneven" [11:209] . This more nuanced understanding fits very well with our data. In this organization of "responsible individuals who exercise power" [32] , the security policy is not "sovereign", in any simple sense, but asserts its "power in-the-world" [21: 119] through a play of strategic forces.
B. Frameworks of Power
A different kind of three-dimensional model is that of the Circuits of Power developed by Clegg [11] . Clegg has criticized Lukes' supposed moral relativism [27] , but his integrative model freely includes Lukes' ideas, along with other perspectives from the social science literature on power. The model's high level of abstraction makes it widely applicable, yet it is designed to be used -Clegg gives worked case studies -to analyze practical scenarios in empirical research [37] . Clegg's model has been used in most of the (small) existing literature on power in information security, but without our focus on both the high level of policy and on information security in daily experience.
The model is based on three circuits, the micro-level circuit of episodic agency and two macro-level circuits of social and system integration ( Figure 1 ).
1) Episodic Agency Power
The most obvious and easy accessible instances of power, as an organization asserts the need for information security, are the passwords, ID cards, open or closed computer builds, firewalls, etc., which form the daily practices of information security. These could be categorized as what we have referred to as enforcement of policies, but, in our analysis, enforcement is not simply the converse of trust. As the most visible manifestations of power, these practices are easily mistaken for the totality; this is the "normal power" of most social science.
These "episodic" power relations draw from, and lead into, "macro-level" circuits in which "rules, relations and resources" [11:211] are reproduced or transformed, fixed or refixed, facilitated or restricted. These other circuits, which Clegg [11] terms the circuits of social and system integration, make up a "field of force" within which certain fixtures of meaning are privileged.
2) Social and System integration
Social integration centers on the constitution and reproduction of rules of meaning and membership. This construction may draw on various human, social, and technological actors and techniques of control, but power comes from the meaning that is attached to these entities. This is "dispositional" power, in the sense that it is a capacity to wield power, whether or not it actually is exercised.
Conversely, system integration is concerned with power through "material conditions": "the technological means of control over the physical and social environment" and also "the material means of organization and violence" [31:251] System integration covers whatever an o whether technology, physical constraints, or ru contractual enforcement, to enforce the insti This is productive power, or "power-to", "facilitative" power [11] . Davenport & Leitch the use of delegated authority in facilita empower stakeholders while at the same ti power of the agency which deploys it.
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The basic premise is a rejection of any ess between human and non-human actors; the sometimes used to emphasize the symmetry and non-human actors. This apparently controversial) change in the conventional w about technology and materiality opens up a of power, in which agency is not specific to hu in which actors are related not by pre-existing but in networks which emerge through their ow
D. Obligatory Passage Points
Central to these Actor Networks, and the Circuits of Power, is the concept of an "ob point". This can be thought of as a rhetorical set of actors presents a problem so as to assert rganization uses, ules backed up by tutional patterns. and hence also h [13] argue that ative power can ime increase the ciety made to organizational e ways in which to produce and this, we draw on s well as a theory and which Clegg alyze relations in eory allows us to ower [30] . sential distinction word "actant" is between human y simple (and way of thinking new formulation uman agency, and g social structures wn actions.
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III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Our 55 interviews covered emp company and their interactions with policies. From our knowledge of specific areas of interest to explo encourage wide-ranging discussion ways these policies are encounte practice.
At the highest level of attitudes our interview schedule around three Representing the circuits of Power: from Clegg [11:214] n in a certain way. Other nd drawn into "alliances", his paper, we are concerned perience of organizational "black box" [29] of security olicies in daily practice.
8] provides an illustration of ower [30] , as an artifact and mers and their room keyspolite notices and a heavy leave the key at the hotel otherwise. They don't even nsight, "power is at its most 2:1].
superficially, only a slight tour is not concerned with cked door, only with keys); roach. This very general n security strengthens our one side our pre-existing "the technological", and ployees at all levels of the h the organizational security the policies, we had some ore, but we were keen to n and narratives around the ered in everyday working s to security, we developed dimensions:
1. How much do participants know about organizational security policies? What training and induction have they received in security policies?
2. To what extent do they comply with these policies? If they do not comply, how do they express this noncompliance and what reasons do they give?
3. How much do they think others know and comply with the policies? What is the organizational security culture?
Although we were interested in security policy and compliance across all areas, we focused particularly on specific policies around ability to install and configure software on PCs and laptops alongside acceptable use; use of encrypted USB sticks -a policy that had been recently introduced; and physical security practices -clear desk, screen locking, and controlled access to sites.
Our Grounded Theory analysis produced a total of 3320 quotations labeled with 3114 raw codes organized by these policy interests, annotated with 311 memos (short notes made during Grounded Theory analysis). Following Grounded Theory [19] tradition, we started from the data, with little more than the general intention to investigate the responses of individual staff members to organizational rules; thus, the search for a suitable theoretical framework was deliberately a posteriori.
IV. APPLYING POWER: THREE EXAMPLES IN INFORMATION SECURITY
To show how this works in practice, and to explore the use of our framework for information security policies, we analyze three situations of power in the company.
In the first example, compliance is largely enforced through technological means; in contrast, in the second example, compliance is not enforced directly, but by rule; in the third example, social norms are enrolled to assist in compliance, but, as we shall see, in other ways compliance is in tension with social norms.
A. Example 1: Technological Enforcement:"Closed build"
Our first example analyses a situation in which compliance is actively enforced by technological means: restricted use of software on company-issue personal computers and laptops, enforced through a closed build. A similar policy restricts acceptable use of the Internet and external email through filters and firewalls. The construct is not actually quite as simple as "no use of non-standard software"; the policy provides for negotiable use of other software or, in exceptional cases, an open build that allows its user to install or configure software. However, any change requires approval by a manager and action by outsourced technical support, which takes time and effort.
1) Response 1: Acceptance
We start by noting that many participants see themselves as unaffected by the acceptable use policy; they never have a reason, in the course of their work, to use non-standard software. Yet these participants, too, are complying with the policy and are, in fact, affected by it, not by what they are "got to do" [12] In effect, maintenance is more centralized and controlled, constraining the availability of software; and this, too, carries organizing costs [34] . Company power is maintained by disempowering staff members, in Clegg's [11] terms.
2) Response 2: Avoidance
Even though the policy is enforced by technological means, this does not mean that compliance is total; a participant describes a simple form of avoidance, using a home computer when software required for business uses was not readily available: Avoidance allows the user to "get the job done", to focus on their primary task; it is a resistant action, not rejection of the policy as a whole. This enforcement is shown to be doubly problematic: the participant felt forced to avoid the rules, but nevertheless was inconvenienced both in attempting to obtain the software and in making the eventual circumvention.
3) Analysis
In our analysis, the actors -employees, the company, computers, software, outsourced technical support, and also actors such as colleagues and customers, with their demands on staff -are "enrolled" to a formulation of the problem that asserts "locked-down access" as an obligatory passage point [8] through which access to software must pass.
Everything revolves around the construction of "lockeddown access", in the form of "closed build", firewalls, filters, etc. But it is clearly not the case that that all access to software must necessarily pass through these points. The policy is easily circumvented if an employee -or their software -rejects the approved route by, for example, using their home computer instead.
B. Example 2: Trust in Situations of Contingency: USB sticks
Our second example focuses on a policy that had been recently introduced in the company. This is the requirement that, whenever data is transferred onto an external USB "thumb drive" or "memory stick", the device used must be a company-issued, 256-bit encrypted drive of a specified brand.
This aspect of security policy is of particular interest because of its recent introduction. From the point of view of enforcement, the issue is interesting because such a policy clearly could be enforced using technological means, but, at the time of our research, was not being enforced in this way.
Use of encrypted USB sticks is clearly an important tool to preserve confidentiality. It does not in itself prevent other USB-associated risks -such as that of importing viruses or malware -but some participants spontaneously mentioned this issue, and, potentially, the requirement to use only company-approved media could also reduce this risk.
1) Circuits of Power in (non)-compliance
The ban on unencrypted USB sticks in the company is, in principle, absolute. As intended by the company, this policy relies strongly on episodic power in the daily practices that are to be followed. That is, the emphasis is on micro-techniques of enforcement, with very little leeway allowed for alternative interpretations. In practice, in the absence of technical enforcement, this power is weak; instead, the power circuits of social and system integration come to the fore.
However, both in the episodic and social/system integration circuits, there are factors in operation that discourage compliance with the policy. The security policy constructs "encrypted USB" as an obligatory point through which all access must pass, but staff members ascribe meaning to the process in their own terms as "business needs", an alternative reading which simply does not require passage through these "obligatory" points.
For example, a common use of USB sticks is to transfer data onto a colleague's computer, or to take it to a nearby printer. Against the official policy, users balance factors such as whether the USB stick and its data leave the immediate work area or the company building, and their perception of the sensitivity of the data.
2) Non-human actors: Cost and changing technology
A strong dis-incentive to use the company-approved USB sticks emerged in terms of cost. Here we noted a wide divergence of practice across the company, with some groups purchasing the approved brand in sufficient numbers for each employee, contrasting with other groups in which the approved sticks were not available; and we found correspondingly varied practices in USB stick use across the company 2 .
Participants reported other barriers to the use of the approved USB sticks, which have a limited storage capacity and, as has been observed in other research, run the risk that a password may be lost at a critical time, with possibly serious consequences [5, 6] . Meanwhile, as participants pointed out, technological developments such as the increasing availability of shared filestore imply that the use of USB sticks for transfer data is less and less necessary.
3) Analysis
This second example provides a useful comparison to the first; there are more complex contingencies in terms of variable access to the technology, and also more alternative routes to the overall goal of getting the job done. From the metaphor of an obligatory passage point, enforcing passage of data through the approved USB route and not through any other requires several contingencies to work together [8] ; without this alignment of actors, non-compliance becomes the easier path.
The company could try to strengthen the obligatory passage point using the technical means of disabling USB transfers altogether -as has sometimes been done in this company. This could deny all USB file transfers, or allow only encrypted access. So the rule as it stands is a move towards trust in employees; technical enforcement would inevitably incur costs, not only financial but also in social capital and goodwill [14] .
The case is also a nice illustration of the interplay of emerging technologies, as the use of shared, access-controlled filestore -now ubiquitous in large organizations -reduces the need for ad-hoc methods such as USB sticks, while with the increasing need for very large files, the limited size of the encrypted USB sticks becomes a relevant issue. At the social level, organizational decisions, such as managers' choice to provide budgetary allowance for company-approved USB sticks, and variable training practices, come into play; compliance is therefore highly dependent on external contingencies.
C. Example 3: Physical security and social norms
It is rarely the case that policies are enforced using purely either technological or social constraints. In this third example, we investigate issues around physical security policies that rely on a mixture of social and system power for their enforcement. System power, in this example, is itself partly technologicalphysical access control on doors, electronic access cards for staff -and partly mediated by humans -dedicated security staff and receptionists.
1) (Non)-Obligatory Passage Points
Physical security begins with access to the car park, where a barrier and, sometimes, a security guard controls access. However, access by other means is not controlled at this stage. The second, and most crucial, point of access control is at the point of entrance to the building. This is a very physical example of an obligatory passage point -unlike the barrier to the car park, which can be avoided in various ways.
First problem: there is in reality often not one single entrance, hence no single "passage point".
Second problem: the apparent obligation at to identify oneself at the building entrance is only partial; doors can be held open politely, or intruders can rush through doors which have been left ajar accidentally.
2) Human Actors in Alliance with Technol
To increase the level of enforcement with company could install turnstiles or some physical barrier. Instead, the company has "alliances" [8, 28] with staff members themsel the network; staff are strongly encourag "tailgating" or "piggy-backing", so that every building must be individually authenticated. large company, staff members are not all another, even in a single office site.
Other allies are non-human artifacts. There by each entrance. Some entrances also hav which "beeps" and flashes red or green, b human actors to play their parts alongside the t left to staff members to verify whether this (access denied) or a "green beep" (access allow Staff members are not always willing to a "security enforcer", however; "enrolment", terms, requires negotiation. The compan enforcement pulls against the normal politenes natural desire to avoid confrontation:
you do tend to recognize people, but I thin and age, you don't want to confront people it a bit awkward -European staff member
In being enrolled as allies, employees are ways that run counter to social norms. This [31] between the social and systems integ tension, expressed by avoidance in various quiet word" with offenders, or changing pr ways to avoid the situation of confrontation:
I have to time it so that he at least swipes h I hear the beep, of course I don't know if beep or a red beep, I don't know [what] h he swipes it and it beeps, then I'm fine, so a struggle. … fortunately it's all glass so
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The examples of security in action in our case study show consistent themes reflecting the framework we have developed.
A. Failures in Actor Networks
The first theme, giving practical expression to the theoretical basis that we developed in section II, is that the achievement of security policy emerges from the ways in which human and non-human actors work together. But, notably, each of our examples falls short of achievement of the intended security level in various ways. Locked-down access interferes with employees' primary tasks. Encrypted USB sticks are not available at the moment they are needed. Physical access control conflicts with social norms.
In contrast with Latour's [28] example of hotel customers who comply because they "cannot do otherwise", the company has not quite managed, in any of these examples, to construct a sufficiently robust network -to stabilize successfully around an obligatory passage point -to the extent that staff members are led willingly into compliance. We can imagine what might be necessary to achieve this compliance, but complete enforcement not been achieved, and probably could not be achieved without unacceptable costs in loss of social capital and lost productivity [14] .
B. Tensions Between the Circuits of Power
If we had restricted our analysis to the "episodic" circuit of power, we would have said that there are practical problems in delays in installing software, that USB sticks are not always provided, and that employees feel uncomfortable with the "no tailgating" rule. This would have provided some useful results, but would have not given a full account [37] .
So the second theme is that in each of the examples, failure emerges not from what we can see in a single circuit, but in the flow of power around and between the circuits, and in particular the lack of "fit" [31] between the circuits of social and system integration, and from these macro circuits to the micro-level episodic circuit. This is most obvious in the example of physical access, where the requirements of the system circuit -the control techniques in which require employees to notice "red" or "green" beeps and to challenge incomers if necessary -conflict with social norms. The other two examples also exhibit tension between the circuits of power. Changes to the configuration of firewalls and software are constrained by rules and delays; management decisions at the social level and underlie the availability of encrypted USB sticks, while emerging technology at the system level is an exogenous contingency that increasingly reduces the need for them.
In response, users give different meanings to these Actor Networks. Rather than prioritizing compliance with information security policies, they emphasize "getting the job done". Non-compliance is nearly always for "a reason", usually expressed in terms of the business needs of the organization. This alternative meaning is constructed to favor the interests of the user; their interest may be genuinely to meet the needs of the business, or to minimize their own effort -a legitimate reason, given that compliance can never be unlimited [6] .
C. Opening the Black Box
The third theme relates to the concept of abstraction, familiar to Computer Science; Actor-Network Theory provides a parallel notion. Rather than understanding networks at one given level, the detailed working of a network can be considered as a "black box" [29] ; in "blackboxing", some technical or scientific work is made "invisible by its own success" [29:304] ; there is no further need to focus on what happens "inside" the box.
In our empirical study, the unit of analysis was around various aspects of the organization's security policy. But, analytically, we can look at both lower and at higher levels. Within each aspect of the policy, participants responded with accounts of details of daily practice, looking "downwards" to open up the "black box" of each aspect of policy. But our wider concern was "upwards", to gain insight into employees' knowledge and compliance with the policy as a whole; the different factors of the policy are, in effect, all within the "black box" of the overall policy.
Where users feel the need to reject their ascribed place in the socio-technical network, this is not a failure on the part of the user, but a breakdown -"an interruption of the smooth unexamined flow of action" [15] . Such breakdowns are a strong clue to tensions between the circuits of system and social integration [11, 31] ; at such moments of breakdown we open up the otherwise taken-for-granted, opaque "black box".
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Opening and closing "black boxes" -boxes within boxes requires thinking about power at different levels. It is well established that security threats are socio-technical; humans are social beings, neither machines nor unconnected individualsactors rather than mere "factors" [4] . This realization challenges assumptions of hard "sovereign" power -that compliance will follow simply from the command and control authority of the company. Employee acceptance of information security policies requires a more sophisticated approach, which must be based, we have argued, on a well-founded understanding of power provided by Lukes' [32] radical three-dimensional view and Nye's [33] "soft power".
In this paper, we re-consider seminal socio-technical literature in order to develop a view of power that encompasses both the technical and the social, without privileging or making assumptions about either. The strength of our approach is that:
1. we engage directly with users' daily encounters with organizational power, and 2. we show how power is brought into effect in networks of human and non-human actors.
At the risk of over-simplifying, we suggest that Lukes and Nye enable us to see the "what" of organizational power while Actor-Network Theory and Clegg's Circuits of Power provide the mechanics to study the "how".
A. Toward "Soft Power" in Information Security
Our findings resonate with emerging themes in the literature around the relations between organizations and technology: centralization, de-centralization, hierarchy, and co-operation. A core issue is that enforced control introduces hierarchical organization costs while at the same time relies on (human) actors who may not always comply -a clear instance of a principal-agent problem [23] . Meanwhile, using the tools of new institutional economics, Pallas [34] investigates the security implications of co-ordination and motivation in organizations.
This conclusion provides a very brief sketch of a way to combine sociological and economic perspectives; to focus not only on why there are always economic interests but, at macro as well as micro levels, to start to show how these pressures operate and how they may be enrolled to the benefit of organizations and their members. This opens up the "black box" to potential change; it becomes possible to "penser autrement" [17:15] , to think differently, about the possibilities.
